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I. INTRODUCTION
Regulatory parity arguments are hard to ignore because they are
grounded in notions of fairness and equality that are fundamental values in
our society. Additionally, in the context of communications policy, an
economic justification for regulatory parity is that, if all other factors are
equal, regulators should treat similar services similarly in order to promote
efficiency. As Michael Katz, a former FCC Chief Economist, states,
"unless all suppliers are treated equally, regulation-rather than the ability
PARITY RULES
to satisfy consumer demands efficiently-will determine which suppliers
prevail in the telecommunications marketplace."1 If regulatory policy
(rather than the marketplace) decides who prevails, the result is likely to be
"lower quality, less innovation and investment, and higher costs and
prices. '
Yet, as this survey will show, although regulatory parity may be a
laudable goal it is not an easily achievable goal. There is disparate
treatment in all areas of communications policy. To identify the reasons
that disparities continue to exist, it is helpful to keep in mind the following
questions:
* Is the disparity required by statute?
* Is the disparity due to jurisdictional differences? In other
words, is one set of competing providers subject to rules
established by one jurisdiction (such as the FCC) while another
set of providers is subject to rules established by a different
jurisdiction (e.g., states or localities)?
* Is the disparity due to a Commission rule or policy?
" If so, what is the stated justification for the disparity?
The objective of this survey is to understand the extent to which
disparities exist and to explore whether the disparities are justified by
legitimate policy goals. To the extent that disparities are derived from
statutes, it may be beyond the ability of regulators to change. Similarly, to
the extent that disparities result from the allocation of jurisdictional
authority to state or local policymakers, federal regulators may have no
ability to eliminate the disparity. This issue arises, for example, if one
provider is required to pay for spectrum in order to offer a service and
another does not use spectrum at all but has to pay a franchise fee to offer
the service. Should policymakers seek to remedy only disparate treatment
flowing from a specific rule?
An important caution is that it is essential to compare apples to apples
and oranges to oranges (i.e., similar services). This is sometimes not an
easy matter. For purposes of this Article, services are broadly grouped into
voice services (including wireline and wireless telecommunications), video
services (including broadcast TV, cable TV, and Direct Broadcast Satellite
("DBS") services), and data services (including "information services"
1. Michael L. Katz, Regulation: The Next 1000 Years, in Robert M. Entman, Six
Degrees of Competition: Correlating Regulation with the Telecommunications Marketplace,
2000 ASPEN INST. COMM. & SOC'Y PROGRAM 29, available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wpsl
enr02/enr02.pdf. Katz is the Edward J. and Mollie Arnold Professor of Business
Administration at the University of California at Berkeley.
2. Id.
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such as narrowband and broadband Internet access, and ancillary data
services). This categorization is necessary in order to permit an
examination of regulatory parity arguments but, clearly, it has its limits.
Indeed, as noted in subsequent sections, there are strong arguments that
broadcast TV and cable TV are not similar services in many respects.
Further, the categorization used here should not be considered as endorsing
the view that these are similar services for other purposes, such as defining
relevant markets in the context of a merger review.
II. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
A. Background
Telecommunications carriers discussed in this section include
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs"), Competitive Local
Exchange Carriers ("CLECs"), Interexchange Carriers ("IXCs"), and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") carriers. These carriers,
whether they offer wireline or wireless services, supply a conduit over
which two-way, switched voice communications are transmitted.3
Consumers increasingly view all telecommunications services as similar
services, even though carriers may use different transmission platforms and
offer different rate plans.4
3. "Telecommunications" is "the transmission, between or among points ... of
information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the
information." 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000). A "telecommunications carrier" is "any provider
of telecommunications services .... Id. § 153(44). A "telecommunications service" is the
"offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users
as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." Id. §
153(46). "Mobile service" means "a radio communication service carried on between
mobile stations or receivers and land stations, and by mobile stations communicating among
themselves." Id. § 153(27) . Another type of telecommunications carrier is a provider of
"fixed services," who offers "a radio communications service between fixed points." 47
C.F.R. § 101.3 (2002).
For the most part, this Article does not discuss other providers such as resellers and
payphone operators.
4. See, e.g., Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 3752, para. 11, 25 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1455 (2002).
[M]obile service is becoming a substitute for traditional wireline services such
as payphones and second lines to the home, and there is a small but growing
number of customers who have substituted mobile wireless for their primary
residential lines. In addition, many customers are using their mobile service
rather than interexchange service to make long distance calls: according to one
report, 16 percent of customers surveyed now make most of their long
distance calls using mobile services.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Eighth Report, 18 F.C.C.R. 14783, para. 103 (2003) ("The
[Vol. 56
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1. Wireline Telecommunications
The Communications Act of 1934 grants the states jurisdiction over
intrastate telecommunications and the FCC jurisdiction over interstate
calls.5 Jurisdictional disputes between federal and state regulators are
inevitable because, as one commentator notes, "[e]very telecom box or
wire is located in one state or another, and is thus a candidate for local
regulation. Virtually every box or wire also connects in one way or another
to facilities that cross state lines, and is thus a candidate for federal
control."6 The most recent boundary drawing gave the FCC, and not the
states, authority to set the rules for interconnection and unbundling of local
telephone networks, pursuant to Section 251 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 ("1996 Act").7
An important jurisdictional issue involves separations issues, such as
cost allocation of joint and common costs between interstate and intrastate
rate bases. Separations issues arise because, "virtually [every] telephone
plant that is used to provide intrastate service, is also used to provide
interstate service, and thus is conceivably within the jurisdiction of both
state and federal authorities."8 Congress did not resolve separations
disputes, but instead required the FCC to adopt a procedure for resolving
them.9 Separations issues are addressed in a Federal-State Joint Board.'
The FCC's role in regulating access to the interstate interexchange
services market has undergone several changes over time. First, for about
twenty-five years beginning in 1934, the FCC generally held that
telecommunications was a natural monopoly that foreclosed competitive
entry.'1 Second, after permitting limited competition to surface in the
long-distance, local, and payphone segments of wireline telecommunications have all been
losing business to wireless substitution.").
5. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 152, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (2000).
6. JOHN THORNE ET AL, FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW 166 (1995) [hereinafter FEDERAL
BROADBAND LAW].
7. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, apparently was not persuaded by the Eighth Circuit opinion holding that local
interconnection and unbundling were intrastate issues protected by a fence that was "hog
tight, horse high, and bull strong, preventing the FCC from intruding on the states' intrastate
turf." Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd, AT&T Corp., 525
U.S. 366.
8. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986).
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 221(c) (2000).
10. See id. § 410.
11. See, e.g., Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., Inc., 2 F.C.C. 592 (1936) (denying applicant
a license to operate between the United States and Norway on a route already served by
RCA Communications); Allocation of Microwave Frequencies Above 890 MHz, Report
and Order, 27 F.C.C. 359, 18 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1767 (1959) (allocating spectrum for
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1960s, the Commission, in a crucial decision, agreed with AT&T that it had
no obligation to interconnect with new entrants, other than for the limited
purpose of offering private line service.' 2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed this ruling, leading the Commission
in 1980 to adopt an open entry policy for all interstate services. 3 Third, the
FCC further undermined the Bell long-distance monopoly in the 1980s by
permitting resale and requiring equal access.'" Finally, as required by the
1996 Act, the FCC has sought to implement the Section 271 requirement
that the Bell companies satisfy certain preconditions for long-distance
entry.
15
All carriers, except the former Bell companies, 16 are permitted to
offer domestic interexchange services without obtaining prior authority
from the FCC.' 7 Within their in-region states, the Bells are required to open
up local markets as the quid pro quo for offering long-distance services.1
8
private use bypassing the Bell network); see PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 734 (1999) [hereinafter FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW]
("[C]ompetition was considered to be inefficient in the short run and not economically
viable in the long run, so the Commission did nothing to encourage it.").
12. AT&T Co. et al., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 67 F.C.C.2d 1455, 42 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 789 (1978) (concerning MCI's Execunet service); See also FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 754-56 (discussing MCI v. FCC, 580 F.2d
590 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
13. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of
Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 81 F.C.C.2d 177, 48 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 67 (1980).
14. See, e.g., Resale and Shared Use, Report and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 167, para. 18, 48
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1067 (1980); AT&T Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 94
F.C.C.2d 1110, 53 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 112 (1983); MTS/WATS Market Structure, Report
and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 860, 57 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1303 (1985); see also FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 756-60, 766-70.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2000); see also FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note
11, at 733, 830-49.
16. 47 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2000) ("Neither a Bell operating company, nor any affiliate of a
Bell operating company, may provide interLATA services except as provided in this
section.").
17. 47 C.F.R. § 63.01 (2002) ("Any party that would be a domestic interstate common
carrier is authorized to provide domestic interstate services to any domestic point.").
Carriers, however, must obtain approval to discontinue service. Id. § 63.71.
18. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1) (2000). In December 2003, the Commission announced
that Bells in all states had satisfied the statutory requirement to open their in-region markets
to local competition. Press Release, FCC, Bell Operating Companies Long Distance
Application Process Concludes: Entire Country Authorized for "All Distance" Service,
(Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
241858A1.doc.
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2. Wireless Telecommunications
Wireless telecommunications services include mobile and fixed
wireless services. As required by Section 332 of the 1996 Act, providers of
"mobile services" (including cellular, paging, specialized mobile radio
("SMR"), and personal communications services ("PCS")) are collectively
referred to as CMRS carriers.19 In 1994, the Commission adopted rules
generally distinguishing mobile from fixed wireless services for purposes
of implementing Section 332. The Commission held that services provided
through equipment that is "capable of transmitting while the platform is
moving" are mobile services. 20 The Commission subsequently amended its
rules to permit CMRS carriers to provide fixed wireless services on a co-
primary basis with mobile services.21
Cellular licenses, first issued in 1981, were assigned to the incumbent
wireline carriers ("B" Block) and awarded through comparative hearings to
the new entrants ("A" Block).22 SMR licenses were initially issued for
private carriage services, such as taxicab dispatch services, but were
subsequently modified to authorize wireless telecommunications services.23
PCS was authorized in 1992.24 Since 1993, licenses for most wireless
telecommunications services (including cellular, PCS, SMR, and paging)
19. Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Second
Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, para. 11, 74 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 835 (1994)
[hereinafter CMRS Second Report and Order] (classifying cellular, paging, SMR, and PCS
as CMRS services).
20. Id. para. 38.
21. Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Permit Flexible Serv. Offerings in the
Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 1I F.C.C.R. 8965, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1190 (1996) [hereinafter CMRS
First Report and Order]. The Commission later stated it would decide, on a case-by-case
basis, how fixed and hybrid wireless services should be regulated. Amendment of the
Comm'n's Rules to Permit Flexible Serv. Offerings in the Commercial Mobile Radio
Services, Second Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 15 F.C.C.R. 14680, 21
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 638 (2000).
22. Cellular Comm. Systems, Report and Order (Proceeding Terminated), 86 F.C.C.2d
469, 49 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 809 (1981).
23. Amendment of Part 90 of the Comm'n's Rules to Facilitate Further Development of
SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency Band, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
10 F.C.C.R. 7970 (1994); see also FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at
924-27.
24. Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New
Telecomm. Techs., Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 7 F.C.C.R. 1542 (1992).
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have been issued by auction.25 CMRS providers generally are permitted to
disaggregate or partition their spectrum for sale.26
For CMRS services, Congress preempted state authority to regulate
intrastate rates and entry. As a result, the FCC has authority over regulating
interstate rates and entry, 27 and the states have authority to regulate "other
terms and conditions. '2 8 States continue to have authority to regulate rates
and entry of fixed wireless services. In addition, states and local
governments also have authority over siting towers and other facilities used
to provide wireless services.2 9 Moreover, states may petition the FCC for
authority to regulate rates, and several states which had been regulating
rates filed petitions to continue doing so, but these petitions were denied.3 °
In practical terms, the FCC has "close to absolute authority over the
structure of the [wireless telecommunications] industry, the geographic
markets it serves and the services it provides.'
25. See Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, FCC, Auctions Summary, available at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/summary.html (last updated Feb. 25, 2004) (listing auction
completion dates and amounts).
26. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Second Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 11266, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1997); Geographic
Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation by Commercial Mobile Radio Servs. Licensees,
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21831, 5
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 634 (1996); CMRS First Report and Order, supra note 21. See
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 881 n.88, 911 n.232.
27. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000) (stating that states may not regulate "the entry of
or the rates charged by" a CMRS provider). Until states were preempted by Congress in
1993, states had authority to regulate rates for purely intrastate wireless services. FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW supra note 11, at 869.
28. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A). See FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11
at 870, n.46 (by "other terms and conditions," Congress was referring to customer billing,
consumer protection, and facilities siting issues).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (providing, however, that states may not use this authority to
unreasonably discriminate among providers, and that all decisions must be in writing and
supported by substantial evidence). In addition, states may not enact barriers to entry of
telecommunications providers. See id. § 253. States and local governments are also
prohibited from regulating zoning/siting of wireless facilities based on radio frequency
effects so long as the facilities comply with FCC radio frequency regulations. See id. §
332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A). The FCC may authorize state rate regulation under two
conditions: (a) rates are unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory; or (b) wireless services are
a replacement for wired telecommunications for a substantial portion of local exchange
service subscribers in the state. Id. States with rate regulation in effect in 1993 were
authorized to petition the FCC to continue such regulation. Id. § 332(c)(3)(B); see FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 872 (noting FCC denials of petitions from
Connecticut, Ohio, California, Louisiana, Arizona, New York, and Hawaii).
3 1. FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 867.
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B. Regulatory Issues
1. Market Power
Under long-established principles, all telecommunications carriers are
generally classified as common carriers that do not "make individualized
decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal., 3' They
are required to offer service at reasonable rates and to serve all consumers
on the same nondiscriminatory terms.33 In the Competitive Carrier
proceeding, conducted between 1979 and 1985, the Commission
distinguished between carriers with market power (who were classified as
dominant carriers) and carriers without market power (who were classified
as nondominant carriers).34 The Commission reduced regulation of the
nondominant carriers, on the grounds that they lacked the ability to harm
consumers by offering telecommunications services at unjust and
unreasonable rates, terms, and conditions.3 5 As a result, nondominant
carriers are not subject to several common carrier duties. Thus:
e ILECs must file tariffs with supporting information, which in some
cases includes detailed cost data.3 6 Long-distance and CMRS carriers, as
nondominant carriers, are not permitted to file tariffs, 37 but CLECs may do
SO.
38
* The Commission regulates LEC access charges; Bell Operating
Companies ("BOCs") and certain other large ILECs are subject to price cap
regulation, while smaller ILECs are subject to rate of return regulation.
(Price cap ILECs may seek pricing flexibility as competition develops. 39)
32. Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976); See
FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW, supra note 6, at 290.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b), 202(a) (2000) (prohibiting unjust or unreasonable
discrimination or giving undue or unreasonable preference with respect to any charges,
classifications or services).
34. See Competitive Carrier Servs., Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985).
35. Id. para. 12.
36. 47 C.F.R. § 61.38 (2003).
37. Id. § 61.19 (2003).
38. Id. § 61.39 (2003); see Hyperion Telecomm. Inc. Petition Requesting Forbearance,
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 8596, 8
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 730 (1997) (granting permissive detariffing for interstate access
service providers other than ILECs).
39. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 61.41-61.49 (price cap rules), 65.100-65.830 (rate of return rules);
Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exch. Carriers, Fifth Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 14221, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 299
(1999); Multi Ass'n Group (MAG) Plan for Reg. of Interstate Servs. of Non-Price Cap
Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers and Interexch. Carriers, Second Report and Order and
Number 3]
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By contrast, AT&T's long-distance rates have not been regulated since
AT&T was classified as nondominant in 1995.4' CLECs face limited rate
regulation (i.e., they cannot set access charges at levels higher than the
rates charged by ILECs).41
eReporting requirements, such as filing Automated Reporting
Management Information System ("ARMIS") reports, are imposed on large
and midsize ILECs but not IXCs, CLECs, or CMRS carriers.42
In addition, in 1992, Congress classified all CMRS providers as
common carriers but authorized the Commission to forbear from enforcing
any Title II provisions other than Sections 201, 202, and 208.4" The
Commission very quickly determined that CMRS carriers lacked market
power and exempted them from requirements to file tariffs, submit copies
of contracts with other carriers to the FCC, notify the Commission of
interlocking directorates, or obtain prior approval before initiating or
terminating service." The Commission declined to forbear from other
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 00-256, Fifteenth Report and
Order in CC Docket No. 96-45, and Report and Order in CC Docket Nos. 98-77 and 98-
166, 16 F.C.C.R. 19613, 25 Comm. Reg. 1 (2001).
40. Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Nondominant Carrier, Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 3271, para. 163, 1 Comm. Reg. 63 (1995). Payphone providers, similarly,
benefited from a Commission ruling that rate regulation was not needed. Illinois Pub.
Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 562-3 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that since statute
required that payphone providers be "fairly compensated," Commission was justified in
favoring market forces over rate regulation).
41. Access Charge Reform, Seventh Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9923, paras. 32, 40-44 (2001) (noting that the "market for access
services does not appear to be structured in a manner that allows competition to discipline
rates.") (emphasis omitted).
42. ARMIS collects information required in 47 C.F.R. Parts 32, 36, 43, 51, 64, 65, and
69. FCC, ARMIS Data Descriptions, available at http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/armis/
descriptions.html (last updated Apr. 1, 2004). See Indus. Analysis & Tech. Div., FCC,
ARMIS Filing Requirements for Carriers, at www.fcc.gov/wcb/armis/filereqt.html
(describing revenue, corporate structure, and price cap status of ILECs required to file
ARMIS reports).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1) (2000). Sections 201 and 202 generally require carriers to
serve the public at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates. See id. §§ 201, 202 (2000).
Section 208 authorizes the Commission to investigate complaints for violations of the
applicable rules by common carriers. See id. § 208 (2000). The Commission was petitioned
to forbear from applying Sections 201 and 202 to PCS providers, but declined to do so. Pers.
Comm. Indus. Ass'n Broadband Pers. Comm. Servs. Alliance's Petition for Forbearance for
Broadband Pers. Comm. Servs., Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 16857, para. 119, 12 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 852 (1998) [hereinafter
PCIA Broadband PCS Petition].
44. CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 21, paras. 173-82, 196-197. Thus,
CMRS carriers are exempt from some of the statutory requirements that apply to other
common carriers. See 47 U.S.C § 203 (tariff filing requirements); id. § 204 (tariff
suspensions); id. § 205 (requirements to offer services at just and reasonable rates); id. § 211
(requirements to file with the FCC copies of contracts with other carriers); id. § 212
[Vol. 56
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sections, including "dial-a-porn" prohibitions, disability access
requirements, and telemarketing.45 As the Commission noted, "Taken
together, these actions have substantially relieved CMRS providers from
the most burdensome aspects of common carrier regulation.
'46
2. Local Competition
Section 251 of the 1996 Act and Commission rules impose
significantly different requirements on ILECs, CLECs, and CMRS carriers.
All telecommunications carriers have a general duty to interconnect with
each other. In addition, ILECs are required to resell to their competitors
any telecommunications service they offer to the general public, and to do
so at wholesale rates.47 ILECs are also required to offer to their competitors
unbundled network elements ("UNEs"), such as local loop, switching, and
transport, at cost-based rates.48 In deciding which elements the ILEC is
required to unbundle, the 1996 Act specifies that the Commission must
consider whether access to proprietary elements is necessary and whether
failure to provide access to any other elements would impair the ability of
the requesting carrier to compete.49 CLECs who offer facilities-based
competition by building their own infrastructure are entitled to interconnect
(prohibitions on interlocking directorates); id. § 214 (service initiation and discontinuance
requirements).
45. CMRS Second Report and Order, supra note 19, paras. 205-213. CMRS carriers are
not exempt, however, from all of the statutory requirements applicable to all common
carriers. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (prohibitions against making or permitting obscene or
harassing calls); id. § 225 (disability access requirements); id. § 226 (operator services
rules); id. § 227 (telemarketing rules); id. § 228 (pay-per-call services rules). See also
Forbearance from Applying Provisions of the Comm. Act to Wireless Telecomm. Carriers,
First Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 17414, 21 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 802 (2000).
46. PCIA Broadband PCS Petition, supra note 43, para. 8.
47. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (2002).
48. Id. § 251(c)(3) (2002).
49. Id. § 251(d)(2) (2002); see Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of
the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 18 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 888 (2000), rev'd and
remanded, U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (setting forth
principles for determining the "impair" standard), cert. denied sub nom. WorldCom, Inc. v.
U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 538 U.S. 940 (2003). In August, 2003, the Commission held that,
based on a finding of "impairment" on a state-by-state basis, LECs could be required to
provide unbundled access to switches for the residential market. Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers, Report and Order and Order
on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, paras. 486-
524 (2003) [hereinafter Triennial Review Order]. On March 2, 2004, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Commission's decision with respect to
switches. See USTA v. FCC, No. 00-10 12, 2004 WL 374262, slip op. at 11-26, 34-46 (D.C.
Cir. 2004). Other aspects of this decision are discussed in section IV.B. ., infra.
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with all other telecommunications carriers.50 They are not required to offer
potential competitors unbundled access to network elements or to resell
their telecommunications services at wholesale rates.5 In addition, like all
local exchange carriers, they have a duty under Section 251(b) not to
prohibit resale, to provide for number portability, to give access to rights of
way for pole attachment purposes, and to establish reciprocal compensation
arrangements for transport and termination of local traffic.52
CMRS carriers, too, have a general duty to interconnect with other
telecommunications carriers and, as providers of "telephone exchange
service," are entitled to interconnect with the landline networks at cost-
based rates.53 Because the Commission has determined that CMRS
providers are not at present LECs, they are not required to offer
interconnection to requesting telecommunications carriers at cost-based
rates under Section 251(b).' However, the Commission has imposed other
obligations on CMRS carriers through regulation. For instance, cellular,
broadband PCS, and SMR providers were prohibited, until November 24,
2002, from restricting resale of their services. 5 CMRS carriers are not
required to provide CMRS-CMRS interconnection or interconnect their
switches directly with CMRS resellers' switches.56 The Commission
required CMRS carriers to provide local number portability to enable
CMRS customers to "port" their telephone numbers if they switch from one
CMRS carrier to another or from a CMRS to a wireline carrier.57 However,
50. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2002).
51. FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 481-484.
52. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b).
53. See Implementation of the Local Competition Requirements of the 1996 Act, First
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, paras. 1012-15, 4 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Local Competition Order].
54. Id. paras. 1004-05.
55. 47 C.F.R. § 20.12 (2003); see also Interconnection and Resale Obligations
Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 18455,
paras. 15-21, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 895 (1996). After November 24, 2002, although the
Commission's rules do not explicitly require resale of wireless services, carriers continue to
be bound by the Communications Act's general prohibition against discrimination, and
complaints alleging denial of resale agreements will be decided on a case-by-case basis to
determine if they violate antidiscrimination requirements. Id. para. 22; see 47 U.S.C. §§
201-202 (2002) (requiring nondiscriminatory treatment).
56. Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio
Servs., Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, paras. 14-22, 26-29, 21 Comm.
Reg.2d (P & F) 669 (2000); see also Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of Comm.
Act, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Partial Reconsideration of Second Report and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 19729, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1302 (1996).
57. Cellular Telecomm. Indus. Ass'n's Petition for Forbearance from Commercial
Mobile Radio Servs. Number Portability Obligations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 3092, para. 39, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 82 (1999) [hereinafter CTIA Petition].
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the Commission granted CMRS carriers an extension until November 24,
2003, to implement local number portability plans.58 The Commission
noted that CMRS carriers face unique technical difficulties, such as the
need to configure their networks so that CMRS users with ported numbers
would be able to make and receive calls while roaming outside their home
areas.
59
LECs are required to provide equal access to other carriers serving the
long-distance market.' Under equal access, IXCs are able to get access to
consumers (or, alternatively, consumers are able to select the long-distance
carrier of their choice). 6' Equal access obligations apply also to other types
of interstate services, such as 800 numbers, calling cards, and operator
services.62 Congress prohibited the Commission from imposing equal
access rules on CMRS carriers. 63
3. Universal Service
The 1996 Act requires all telecommunications carriers that provide
interstate telecommunications services to "contribute, on an equitable and
nondiscriminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient
mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and advance
universal service. ' The 1996 Act also grants the Commission permissive
authority to require providers of interstate telecommunications to
contribute to universal service if the public interest so requires, and to
exempt from contribution obligations carriers whose contributions would
be de minimis. 65 Carriers must contribute even if they are not eligible to
receive universal service support.66 The Commission decided to assess
contributions on carriers' end-user telecommunications revenues on a
58. Verizon Wireless's Petition for Partial Forbearance from the Commercial Mobile
Radio Servs. Number Portability Obligation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R.
14972, para. 23, 27 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 331 (2002); see also Cellular Telecomm. Indus.
Ass'n's Petition for Forbearance from Commercial Mobile Radio Servs. Number Portability
Obligations, Order on Reconsideration, 15 F.C.C.R. 4727, 19 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1041
(2000).
59. CTIA Petition, supra note 57, paras. 40-41.
60. 47 U.S.C. § 25 1(g) (2002).
61. FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 767.
62. Id. at 777-85.
63. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(8).
64. Id. § 254(d).
65. Id.
66. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Fourth Order on Reconsideration in CC
Docket No. 96-45, Report and Order in CC Docket Nos. 96-45, 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, 95-
72, 13 F.C.C.R. 5318, paras. 262-266, 288-289 (1997).
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competitively neutral basis. 67 Foreign carriers providing interstate or
international telecommunications in the United States are generally not
required to contribute. Domestic carriers must include revenues derived
from interstate and international telecommunications in their assessment
base.68
CMRS carriers, as telecommunications carriers providing interstate
telecommunications services, are required to contribute to universal
service. But, because of the nature of mobile services, these carriers cannot
easily separate their intrastate and interstate revenues.69 For instance,
because a single switch may serve areas located in more than one state,
calls originating and terminating in one state may be transported by a
switch in another state. In addition, a mobile caller could travel from one
state to another during the course of a call, making it difficult to determine
whether it should be classified as an interstate or intrastate call. Thus, until
final rules are set, the FCC has established an interim "safe harbor"
specifying that, for purposes of calculating contribution obligations,
cellular, PCS broadband, and digital SMR carriers may elect to report up to
28.5% of their total telecommunications revenues as interstate, and paging
providers may elect to report up to twelve percent of total
telecommunications revenues as interstate.7°
In 2002, the largest contributors were IXCs, who contributed
approximately fifty-five percent of the total support. IXCs include long-
distance carriers, toll resellers, and pre-paid calling card providers. (In
addition, Bell companies contributed almost four percent from their
interstate toll revenues.) The next largest group is providers of interstate
exchange access services, such as ILECs, and CLECs. ILECs contributed
67. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, paras.
843-54 (1997) [hereinafter Universal Service Order].
68. Id. para. 779. If contributors' interstate revenues are equal to or greater than twelve
percent of total interstate and international revenues, their contributions are based on both
categories of revenue. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 3752, paras. 125-28, 25 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 1451 (2002).
69. See Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Memorandum Opinion and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 21252, para. 6, 14 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 64 (1998) [hereafter Interim CMRS Safe Harbor].
70. See Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order and Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 24952, paras. 21-22 (2002) [hereinafter
Contribution Methodology Order and NPRM] (raising "safe harbor" from 15% percent to
28.5% due to increased mobile wireless usage for interstate calls).The Commission noted
that CMRS carriers that elect the interim "safe harbor" may assume that the Commission
will not question the data underlying the percentages. Interim CMRS Safe Harbor, supra
note 69, para. 13.
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approximately twenty-three percent, and CLECs contributed approximately
three percent. Wireless providers contributed about fifteen percent.71
The Commission also recently began a proceeding to review its
universal contribution methodology in light of technical and marketplace
developments that have resulted in a decline in interstate
telecommunications revenues.72 One proposal under consideration would
require contributions on the basis of connections to the network.73
4. Intercarrier Compensation
In April 2001, the Commission initiated a proceeding to explore the
feasibility of adopting a unified regime for compensating carriers for
exchanging telecommunications traffic.74 The Commission stated that a
unified compensation regime was needed because the existing
compensation arrangements exhibited "symptoms of market failure. 75 In
particular, the Commission sought comment on proposals to reform two
main types of intercarrier compensation for essentially the same type of
service.
Access charges are the rates IXCs pay to LECs for origination and
termination of long-distance traffic. 76 Reciprocal compensation is the
arrangement for all other carriers for transport and termination of local
calls. The 1996 Act requires LECs to offer reciprocal compensation
arrangements for the transport and termination of local traffic.77
Access charges are determined by rate of return or price cap rules or
the CALLS plan. 78 By contrast, reciprocal compensation charges must be
71. See FCC, Trends in Telephone Service, at Table 19.6 (2003), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/trends.html. The data for ILECs includes contributions from
RBOC's CLEC affiliates. Id.
72. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16
F.C.C.R. 9892 (2001).
73. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 3752, paras. 34-83, 25 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1451
(2002); Contribution Methodology Order, supra note 70, paras. 70-74 (seeking further
comment on proposals).
74. Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610 (2001) [hereinafter Intercarrier Compensation NPRM].
75. Id. para. 2.
76. See Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15982, para. 20
(1997).
77. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (2000).
78. Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, supra note 74, para. 7 n.6. CALLS is a plan
developed by the Coalition for Affordable Local and Long Distance Service ("CALLS"),
and adopted by the Commission, to reduce access charges over the next five years. Access
Charge Reform, Sixth Report and Order in CC Docket Nos. 96-262 and 94-1, Report and
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set at forward-looking economic Cost. 7 9 Thus, although both types of calls
cost essentially the same, rates may differ greatly. In addition, information
service providers are exempt from paying per-minute access charges to the
local phone companies.8°
Chart: Intercarrier Compensation
Local call (LEC to LEG):
reciprocal compensation
Dial-up Internet call (LEC
to LEC to 2d LEC's ISP
customer): reciprocal
compensation, subject to
interim caps.
Long distance
(LEC to IXC to LEG):
IXC pays access charges at
both ends
Local call (CMRS to LEG):
Reciprocal compensation
Long distance (CMRS to
IXC to LEG): IXC pays
terminating access to LEC,
negotiates an arrangement
with CMRS
Internet access (CMRS to
LEC to LEC's ISP
customer): reciprocal
compensation
Terminating Local (LEC to CMRS): Local (CMRS to CMRS):
Wireless Reciprocal compensation Reciprocal compensation.
[CMRS may use cost study Long distance
to charge higher rate than (CMRS to IXC to CMRS):
LEC charges] IXC negotiates any
Long distance (LEC to IXC originating and terminating
to CMRS): IXC negotiates fees to CMRS
with CMRS
To summarize the main compensation arrangements:
* Carriers use reciprocal compensation arrangements to compensate
each other for transporting and terminating local traffic, whether the
call originates on a wireline or wireless phone.
* For long-distance calls, different rates apply, depending on whether
the caller uses a wireline or wireless telephone. For wireline calls, the
Order in CC Docket No. 99-249, Eleventh Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-45, 15
F.C.C.R. 12962, 20 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 636 (2000).
79. 47 C.F.R. § 51.705 (2002); see also Local Competition Order, supra note 53, paras.
1111-18.
80. See MTS & WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97
F.C.C.2d 682, paras. 75-90, 54 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 615 (1983); Amendments to Part 69 of
the Comm'n's Rules Relating to Enhanced Serv. Providers, Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 2631, 64
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1294 (1988).
Terminating
LEC
[Vol. 56
PARITY RULES
IXC pays access charges to the LEC at both ends of the call. For
wireless calls to an LEC customer, the IXC pays access charges to
the LEC at the terminating end and negotiates an originating charge
with the CMRS provider. For wireless calls to a wireless customer,
the IXC negotiates originating and terminating fees with both CMRS
providers.
e For a dial-up Internet access call by an LEC customer, the ISP is not
required to pay access charges to the LEC. For wireless Internet
access, the CMRS carrier and the LEC serving the ISP negotiate a
reciprocal compensation arrangement. The Commission determined
that the 1996 Act also requires LECs to enter into reciprocal
compensation arrangements with CMRS carriers for the transport and
termination of local traffic. 8 1 Compensation between LEC and
CMRS providers must be symmetrical: an LEC must pay a CMRS
provider the same rate for transport and termination of a call as the
rate it charges for transport and termination of a call originated by the
CMRS provider. But since CMRS subscribers may move locations
during the course of a call, it is not always possible to determine the
exact transport and termination rate. 82 Thus, the Commission
authorized the parties to extrapolate rates based on traffic studies. 83
There has been an ongoing dispute about the appropriate
compensation rules for calls to ISPs. CLECs argue that they should be
compensated for delivering an ILEC customer's calls to their ISP customer.
ILECs argue that such calls are interstate and not local, therefore rendering
Section 251(b)(5) inapplicable. The Commission initially ruled that ISP-
bound traffic was interstate in nature but permitted states to determine if
reciprocal compensation rules should apply.84 CLECs appealed, and the
D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the Commission for a fuller explanation
of its ruling.85 On remand, the Commission concluded that Congress
81. Local Competition Order, supra note 53, paras. 1094-95.
82. A CMRS caller may cross state lines or local boundaries during the course of a
single call, making it difficult to determine jurisdictional issues. This could affect carrier
compensation rates. As the Commission noted, "traffic between an incumbent LEC and a
CMRS network that originates and terminates within the same MTA... is subject to
transport and termination rates under section 251(b)(5), rather than interstate or intrastate
access charges." Id. para. 1043.
83. Id. para. 1044.
84. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996,
Declaratory Ruling in CC Docket No. 96-98 and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC
Docket No. 99-68, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, paras. 21-27, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 201 (1999). The
Commission also initiated a rulemaking to consider intercarrier compensation rules for ISP-
bound traffic. Id. para 28.
85. Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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intended to exclude ISP-bound traffic from reciprocal compensation
arrangements, and determined that it would establish a separate cost-
recovery mechanism for such traffic.8 6 The Commission also set an interim
cap on ILEC payments to CLECs as reciprocal compensation for calls to
ISPs.
87
C. Summary and Analysis
As summarized below, some telecommunications carriers are treated
differently because they are singled out by a statute, because they have
market power, or because they are regulated by different entities.
1. Statutes
Congress imposed the local competition requirements on ILECs.
Thus, ILECs, but not other carriers, must offer to interconnect at cost,
unbundle network elements, and resell telecommunications services at
wholesale rates. Congress also statutorily exempted CMRS carriers from
equal access obligations that fall upon other carriers. Congress did not
create statutory exemptions for particular carriers with respect to local
number portability and universal service contribution requirements, and the
Commission has striven to achieve parity (or at least comparability) in
those areas. For instance, CMRS carriers were given additional time to
comply with local number portability rules because of features that are
unique to CMRS carriers. CMRS carriers are also permitted, on an interim
basis, to contribute to universal service based upon a 28.5% safe harbor of
revenues, rather than attempt to separate local from interstate traffic as
other carriers must do.
With respect to "mobile services," all carriers are treated alike, as
required by statute.
2. Commission Rules
Carriers with market power must comply with various dominant
carrier rules. Competitive carriers (e.g., CMRS carriers, CLECs,
nondominant IXCs) are exempt from the most burdensome regulations or
are fully deregulated. In addition, ILECs and CLECs (with respect to
86. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996,
Order on Remand and Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151, paras. 3-6, 23 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 678 (2001) [hereinafter Compensation for ISP-bound Traffic], rev'd and remanded sub
nom. WorldCom v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that Commission lacks
authority under 47 U.S.C. § 25 1(g) and remanding for further proceedings but not vacating
rules).
87. Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, supra note 86, para. 8 (setting rate caps and
total ISP-bound minutes for which LEC may receive compensation in the interim period).
[Vol. 56
PARITY RULES
access charges for terminating access services) are subject to rate
regulation because they are dominant carriers. These rules are imposed by
the Commission on the basis of differences in market power. The authority
to regulate market power flows from the Commission's statutory mandate
to ensure that consumers are protected against unfair and discriminatory
pricing, which market power can promote. Thus, disparate treatment based
on whether or not a carrier has market power continues to exist as a well-
established feature of communications law.
Differences also exist with respect to intercarrier compensation and
may prove difficult to eliminate. As the Commission has recognized, these
issues are inextricably intertwined with access charge reform and reform of
universal services funding.88 In March, 2004, the Commission sought
additional comment on this issue. 9
3. Jurisdictional Differences
The FCC has exclusive authority over CMRS rates, although the
states may petition the FCC to permit state rate regulation under certain
conditions. Authority to regulate rates for wireline telecommunications is
shared between states, who have jurisdiction over intrastate rates, and the
FCC, which has jurisdiction over interstate rates. In these cases, the extent
of rate regulation may vary.
III. VIDEO SERVICES
A. Background
Video services providers such as broadcasters, cable operators, and
Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS") providers deliver content to viewers
using different technologies. 90 Broadcasting is provided free of charge to
88. See, e.g., Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, supra note 74, para 7 n.6.
89. IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC Docket No. 04-28
paras. 61-63 (March 10, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/FCC-04-28A 1.pdf [hereinafter VOIP NPRM].
90. "Broadcasting" is "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be
received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(6)
(2000). "Cable service" is "the one-way transmission to subscribers of . . . video
programming... [and the] subscriber interaction ... which is required for the selection or
use of such ... programming .... " Id. § 522(6). "Direct Broadcast Satellite service" is "a
radio communication service in which signals from earth are retransmitted by high power,
geo-stationary satellites for direct reception by small, inexpensive earth terminals."
Application of Satellite TV Corp. for Auth. to Construct an Experimental Direct Brdcst.
Satellite Sys., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 91 F.C.C.R. 953, para. 1 n.2, 53 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 431 (1982). Other technologies that may become significant video services
providers or distributors in the future are not discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Amendment
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viewers; cable and DBS are subscription services. Cable and DBS are
multichannel systems; broadcast stations generally occupy a single channel.
DBS and some cable systems offer hundreds of digital channels; most
broadcasters and other cable operators do not.
1. Broadcast Television
The FCC sets the initial rules for assigning broadcast licenses, sets
rules for transferring or renewing licenses, and establishes the public
interest obligations, if any, that are imposed on licensees. 91 State authority
is limited to issues on which the FCC has not acted (e.g., advertising by
doctors and lawyers). 92
In exchange for obtaining use of the spectrum without charge,
broadcasters are considered as "public trustees" with special obligations.
93
In a landmark case, Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, the Supreme Court
held that, "[b]ecause of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views
should be expressed on this unique medium."'  Until the 1980s, several
FCC rules directly regulated content to some extent. For instance, the FCC
required broadcasters to ascertain the programming desires of the
community as a condition for license renewal. 95 In 1984, however, the
Commission concluded that broadcast television programming should be
substantially deregulated to permit "marketplace forces, not [FCC]
of Parts 2 and 25 of the Comm'n's Rules to Permit Operation of NGSO FSS Systems,
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Second Report and Order, 17 F.C.C. R. 9614, paras.
126-138, 141 (2002) (authorizing 500 MHz of spectrum in the 12.2 to 12.7 GHz band for
fixed satellite service operators to provide multichannel video distribution of local television
programs to compete with cable TV and DBS operators).
91. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 62-64
(200 1) [hereinafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY].
92. See FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW, supra note 6, at 176.
93. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 157.
94. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). By contrast, in a case involving a newspaper, the Court
said:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and
public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
Miami Herald Publ'g v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
95. See CHARLES D. FERRIS & FRANK W. LLOYD, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION:
CABLE, BROADCASTING, SATELLITE, AND THE INTERNET, para. 3.12 (2003) [hereinafter
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION].
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guidelines," to determine what programs to air on commercial television. 96
Similarly, until it was suspended in 1985 and repealed in 1987, the Fairness
Doctrine required broadcasters to present contrasting viewpoints
("balanced" coverage) on controversial issues of interest to the
community.' In addition, the Commission has since repealed the "personal
attack" and "political reply" rules.
98
2. Cable Services
Although the FCC asserted jurisdiction over cable as early as 1966,
Congress first granted explicit authority in the 1984 Cable Act.99
Subsequently, in 1992 and 1996, Congress added to the federal
responsibility over several specific cable issues. Today, the FCC sets rules
for "must carry," ownership limits, pole attachments, technical standards,
rate regulation, and leased channel access.
Congress created a complex relationship that divides responsibility
between the FCC and the local franchising authorities ("LFAs") with
respect to rate regulation and franchising. l1 The FCC and the LFAs are not
authorized to regulate rates outside the basic tier. LFAs may regulate a
cable system's monthly charges for basic service and equipment leasing,
unless the FCC finds that the cable system is subject to "effective
competition.""1 1 Similarly, LFAs issue cable franchises but are constrained
by federal law from exercising this authority to unreasonably refuse to
96. Commercial TV Stations, Report and Order (Proceeding Terminated), 98 F.C.C.2d
1076, para. 19, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1005 (1984); see also TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 157-58 (discussing FCC retreat from programming
regulation).
97. Fairness Doctrine, Report (Proceeding Terminated), 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 58 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 1137 (1985); Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, para. 61, 63 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 541 (1987) ( "the fairness
doctrine in operation disserves both the public's right to diverse sources of information and
the broadcaster's interest in free expression").
98. Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, Order
(Proceeding Terminated), 15 F.C.C.R. 20697 (2000); see also Robert W. Leweke, Rules
Without a Home: FCC Enforcement of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 6
COMM. L. & POL'Y 557 (2001).
99. Prior to 1984, the FCC asserted that cable regulation was necessary as "ancillary" to
its authority to regulate broadcasting. The Supreme Court upheld this assertion of
"ancillary" authority in U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). See Stanley
M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1981), excerpted in TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, supra
note 91, at 380-390.
100. See generally TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 413-440;
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION, supra note 95, at ch. 13, sec. A.
101. 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2) (2000).
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renew franchises, 0 2 collect excessive franchise fees,'0 3 or grant exclusive
franchises. "
The courts have not extended the Red Lion analysis to cable operators
but have permitted numerous regulatory restrictions that may limit the
programming they carry. For instance, the courts have upheld the FCC's
"must-carry" rules that require cable operators to allocate channel capacity
to local broadcast stations. 0 5 Similarly, the courts held that national cable
ownership limits tailored to promote diversity and preserve competition do
not violate the First Amendment. 1° 6
3. DBS
The Commission approved the first license for DBS in 1982107 and
declined to apply public interest obligations or almost any other regulations
to the new service. 1 8 In 1988, Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewer
Act ("SHVA"), which included an exemption permitting satellite carriers to
deliver network programming to "unserved households" without the
copyright owner's permission."° In 1992, Congress required DBS
providers to reserve four percent to seven percent of channel capacity for
"noncommercial programming of an educational or informational
nature.""l 0 Congress also required the Commission to impose public
interest obligations on DBS providers, including, at a minimum, the
broadcast time requirement and the use of facilities requirements."' In
1999, Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act
("SHVIA"), which adopted changes in several areas, including
retransmission consent, must-carry, and retransmission of local broadcast
102. Id. § 546.
103. Id. § 542.
104. Id. § 541.
105. Turner Brdcst. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
106. Time Warner Entm't v. U.S., 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Subsequently,
however, the D.C. Circuit overturned the Commission's numeric ownership cap as arbitrary,
and remanded the matter to the FCC for further proceedings. Time Warner Entm't v. U.S.,
240 F.3d 1126 (2001).
107. Satellite TV Corp., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 953, 53 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 431 (1982). See generally TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, supra
note 91, at 541-544.
108. Subscription Video, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 1001, 62 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
389 (1987).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2000).
110. 47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (2000).
111. Id. § 335(a).
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signals. 1t 2 Until SHVIA, DBS providers were prohibited from offering
subscribers access to local TV stations pursuant to the compulsory
copyright licensing process.1 13 In 2004, the Commission reaffirmed that it
has authority to auction DBS licenses because the licenses are used to
provide a domestic service and therefore are not subject to the statutory
prohibition against auctioning spectrum for international satellite
services.1"4
B. Regulatory Issues
1. Content Restrictions
Content-related regulation of broadcasters exists in three areas. First,
FCC guidelines require broadcasters to offer programs at least three hours a
week that serve the educational and informational needs of children under
sixteen.1 15 Broadcasters must file quarterly reports describing the children's
educational programming they offer.'1 6 FCC rules also limit the use of
commercials during children's programming.11 7 Second, broadcasters
cannot refuse to sell airtime to political candidates.118 Also, sponsors of
political advertising must be identified." 9 Third, licensees are prohibited
from broadcasting obscene material at any time 2 ° and indecent material
between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.' The FCC is authorized to impose forfeitures
for any violations of its obscenity and indecency rules.'22 Additionally,
broadcasters are subject to a voluntary ratings system that offers parental
112. Id. § 338; see Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of
1999: Retransmission Consent Issues, First Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 5445, 5447, 19
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1151 (2000).
113. Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999: Broadcast
Signal Carriage Issues, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 1918, 22 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 655
(2000) [hereinafter DBS Broadcast Signal Carriage Issues].
114. Auction of Direct Broadcast Satellite Licenses, Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 820, para. 12
(2004).
115. 47 C.F.R. § 73.671 (2002); see Policies and Rules Concerning Children's TV
Programming, 11 F.C.C.R. 10660, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1385 (1996).
116. 47 C.F.R. § 73.673.
117. Id. § 73.670 (allowing no more than 10.5 minutes per hour during weekends and 12
minutes per hour during the week).
118. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2002); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1944.
119. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212.
120. Id. § 73.3999(a).
121. Id. § 73.3999(b); see Indus. Guidance on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Brdcst. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16
F.C.C.R. 7999, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 857 (2001).
122. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(6), 503(b)(1)(D) (2000).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
guidance on sexual, violent, and indecent content; and all TV equipment
manufacturers are required to install V-chips in TV sets.'23
Cable operators are also subject to several content-related
prohibitions. These rules apply only to the content of programming
generated entirely by cable operators and not to retransmitted broadcast
station signals. 24 First, although cable operators are not required to carry
children's programming, they must limit the use of commercials during any
children's programming they do carry, and they must keep records of such
programming available for public inspection. 25 Second, cable operators are
not required to sell airtime to political candidates, but if they sell
advertising to any candidate, they cannot refuse to sell to other
candidates. 2 6 Also, sponsors of political advertising must be identified. 127
Third, cable operators may transmit sexually explicit programming. 128
DBS providers must permit political candidates to purchase
"reasonable access" to DBS service. 129
2. Access
Cable operators face several requirements to make channel capacity
available. 130 First, local franchising authorities typically require a certain
number of channels designated for use at no charge for public, educational,
or governmental ("PEG") use.' Second, cable operators are required to set
aside certain channels for lease by unaffiliated third parties 32 and are
123. Tech. Requirements to Enable Blocking of Video Programming Based on Program
Ratings, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 11248, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 907 (1998); see
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION, supra note 95, para. 3.20.
124. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION, supra note 95, at para. 8.06.
125. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (allowing no more than 10.5 minutes per hour during weekends
and 12 minutes per hour during the week).
126. Id. § 76.205(a).
127. Id. § 76.1212.
128. Id. § 76.227 (section removed and reserved 2002); see U.S. v. Playboy Entm't
Group, 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (holding unconstitutional statute, 47 § U.S.C. 561, which
required cable operators to scramble sexually explicit programming, on the grounds that less
restrictive alternatives were available).
129. 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(b) (requiring compliance with 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)).
130. Cable operators must also make satellite-delivered cable or satellite-delivered
broadcast programming available to their competitors such as DBS providers. 47 U.S.C. §
548(b) (prohibiting exclusive contracts); see Implementation of the Cable TV Consumer
Protection & Competition Act of 1992, Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 12124, paras. 77-80
(2002) (extending prohibition on exclusivity until October 5, 2007).
131. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (2000); see TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, supra note
91, at 430.
132. 47 U.S.C. § 612.
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permitted to charge the third parties fees for leased access. 133 Parties unable
to obtain access may seek judicial relief. 134 Third, cable systems with more
than thirty-six channels must carry local broadcast TV stations (commercial
and noncommercial) requesting carriage (with some exceptions to avoid
duplication of signals). 135 Stations within a cable system's "designated
market area" are considered local stations for must-carry purposes. 136 Cable
systems must carry the broadcast signal in its entirety and without material
degradation.' 37 Cable operators cannot accept payments from broadcasters
who elect must-carry 138 for carrying the signal or channel positioning. 139
The FCC is authorized to resolve disputes between cable operators and
television stations, and to do so in expedited proceedings. 4 ° Broadcasters
are also entitled to cable carriage of digital signals instead of analog
signals. 4 ' However, an ongoing proceeding includes review of whether
"dual carriage" of analog and digital signals should be required during the
transition to digital broadcasting. 142
If broadcasters elect not to exercise must-carry rights, they may seek
to charge cable operators for the right to retransmit broadcast signals.
Broadcasters may also waive charges or negotiate for other rights, e.g.,
cable carriage of a broadcaster's cable programs. 143 Three further
limitations apply: (1) a local broadcaster may prevent a cable operator from
showing a distant broadcaster's programs for which the local broadcaster
has obtained exclusive rights,'" (2) a broadcaster may similarly block
133. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION, supra note 95, para. 15A.06[7].
134. 47 U.S.C. § 532(d).
135. 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (smaller systems are required to carry fewer channels).
136. Id. § 76.55(e).
137. Id. § 76.62(b). Subsequently, the Commission clarified that only "program-related"
content must be carried, thus excluding Electronic Program Guides. Gemstar Int'l Group,
Ltd. & Gemstar Dev. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 21531, 25
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 333 (2001).
138. Broadcasters who choose the retransmission consent option, instead of exercising
their rights under the "must-carry" regime, are entitled to negotiate payment arrangements.
47 C.F.R. § 76.60(c).
139. Id. § 76.60. Channel positioning refers to the cable system number that is assigned
to broadcast stations and cable networks.
140. 47 U.S.C. § 534(d) (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 76.61.
141. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Digital Brdcst. Stations Have Mandatory
Carriage Rights, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 2692, para. 2, 23 Comm.
Reg (P & F) 582 (2001).
142. Carriage of Digital TV Brdcst. Signals, First Report and Order and Further Notice
of Proposed Rule Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, paras. 8-26 (2001) [hereinafter Carriage
of Digital TV Broadcast Signals].
143. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 453-56 (discussing
different strategies available to broadcast stations).
144. 47 C.F.R. § 76.101 (2002) (syndicated exclusivity).
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network programming for which the broadcaster has obtained exclusive
rights, 145 and (3) sports blackout rules apply. 146
DBS providers must set aside four percent of their channel capacity
for noncommercial educational programming.147 In addition, as a result of
the SHVIA Act of 1999 and the FCC's implementing rules, DBS providers
are subject to a modified "must-carry" requirement that is generally
described as "carry one, carry all."'148 This requirement is triggered only if
DBS providers use the statutory copyright license to retransmit a local
broadcast station. In short, if a DBS provider voluntarily decides to carry
one local station in a market under the statutory license scheme, it is
required to carry all requesting stations in that market. 149 Subsequently, the
Commission adopted rules applying the network nonduplication,
syndicated exclusivity, and sports blackout rules to DBS providers. 5 °
3. Structural Limits
Structural limits have long been a feature of communications
regulatory policy. Over the years, the Commission has modified broadcast
ownership limits on several occasions. 5' In July, 2003, in the Biennial
Review, the Commission adopted several changes to its media ownership
rules. The Commission raised the national ownership cap from thirty-five
percent of the national audience to forty-five percent, eliminated
prohibitions on cross-ownership of newspapers and broadcast TV stations
in the same market, eliminated prohibitions on cross-ownership of radio
and television stations in the same market, modified the local TV multiple
ownership rule, 152 and retained the dual network rule. 153 Subsequently,
145. Id. § 76.92 (network nonduplication).
146. Id. § 76.111 (sports blackout).
147. 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(c).
148. DBS Broadcast Signal Carriage Issues, supra note 113, paras. 3-5, 22. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of this requirement. Satellite Brdcst. &
Comm. Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337 (2001).
149. DBS Broadcast Signal Carriage Issues, supra note 113, paras. 14-15.
150. Carriage of Digital TV Broadcast Signals, supra note 142; see 47 C.F.R. §§
76.120-76.130.
151. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 313-14.
152. The modified rule permits ownership of two stations in markets with seventeen or
fewer TV stations and up to three stations in markets with eighteen or more TV stations.
However, a single entity is not permitted to own more than one station among the top four
stations in any market based on audience share.
153. 2002 Biennial Reg. Rev., Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18
F.C.C.R. 13620, paras. 132-134 (local TV), 235-239 (local radio), 328-330
(newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership), 370-371 (radio/TV cross-ownership), 500-501
(national TV), and 621 (dual network) (2003). The modified local TV rule permits
ownership of two stations in markets with seventeen or fewer TV stations, and up to three
[Vol. 56
PARITY RULES
Congress set the national broadcast TV limit at thirty-nine percent of the
national audience. 154
As a result of judicial action, the prior rule prohibiting common
ownership of a broadcast TV station and cable operator in the same market
has been eliminated. 155 As with all transfers of spectrum licenses, the
Commission is required to determine that foreign ownership exceeding
twenty-five percent serves the public interest. 156
Cable operators also face structural limits. In the Cable TV and
Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Congress directed the Commission to set
rules "establishing reasonable limits on the number of cable subscribers a
person is authorized to reach." 157 Congress identified specific guidelines
the Commission should consider in setting these numerical limits.
Applying these guidelines, the Commission set the following limits: a cable
operator could have an attributable interest in cable systems serving up to
thirty percent of national subscribers158 and forty percent of channel
capacity. 59 In 1999, the Commission adopted new rules for calculating the
cable operator's ownership interests for attribution purposes. 160 In 2001, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the national subscriber and
channel occupancy limits as arbitrary. 61 In 2001, the Commission began
new proceedings to implement the statutory directive on cable
ownership. 162
stations in markets with eighteen or more TV stations. However, a single entity is not
permitted to own more than one station among the top four stations in any market based on
audience share. Id. paras.132-134; see also Sinclair Brdcst. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d
148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that under the Commission's prior local TV rules, adopted in
1999 and vacated in 2002, the same entity may own two commercial TV stations in the
same market provided that both stations are not ranked in the top four, and there are at least
eight other independent stations in the same market). The dual network rule permits multiple
ownership of TV networks but prohibits one of the top four networks (i.e., ABC, CBS, Fox,
or NBC) from buying another of the top four networks.
154. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3
(2004).
155. Fox TV v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The rule was codified at 47
C.F.R. § 76.501(a) (2002).
156. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (2000).
157. Id. § 553(f)(l)(A).
158. 47 C.F.R. § 76.503(a) (2000).
159. Id. § 76.504(a).
160. See Implementation of Section 1 l(c) of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Third Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 19098, 17 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 1158 (1999).
161. Time Warner Entm't v. U.S., 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001). As noted, however,
the court had upheld the constitutionality of national subscriber limits. Time Warner Entm't
v. U.S., 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
162. Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and
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The 1996 Act eliminated prohibitions on telephone companies
offering cable services but limited cross-ownership in the same market. 163
Thus, LECs cannot acquire more than ten percent of a cable operator in
their local markets, except in certain rural and smaller markets. 164 Cable
operators, similarly, may not own more than ten percent of a LEC in its
franchise area.1 65 The Act, however, creates exceptions for rural areas and
certain competitive markets. 166 In addition, the Commission is authorized to
grant waivers if enforcement of these provisions would cause "undue
economic distress" to the cable operator or LEC.167
There is no prohibition on ownership of DBS by cable operators, but
the FCC adopted a "one-time" rule. in 1995 that prohibited a cable operator
with an attributable interest in DBS channels at one orbital location from
acquiring an attributable interest in channels at another orbital location
without divesting its prior interest. 168 In addition, the Commission recently
clarified that the foreign ownership rules do not apply to DBS services that
are offered as subscription services, because these services are neither
common carrier nor broadcast services. 169
C. Summary and Analysis
There appear to be two sets of regulatory parity issues. First, there are
differences in regulatory treatment between broadcasters, on the one hand,
and cable and DBS providers, on the other hand. Second, Congress took
several steps to require some form of regulatory parity between cable and
DBS providers.
Competition Act of 1992, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 17312(2001).
163. 47 U.S.C. § 571 (2000) ("Regulatory treatment of video programming services");
Id. § 572 (cross-ownership limits); see Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, at 13 (1996) (describing repeal of ban and option to
choose "open video systems" regulations).
164. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.505(a), (d).
165. 47 U.S.C. § 572(b).
166. 47 U.S.C. § 572(d).
167. Id. § 572(d)(6).
168. Revision of Rules and Policies for the Direct Brdcst. Satellite Serv., Report and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 9712, para. 62, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 928 (1995) [hereinafter DBS
Auction Order].
169. Policies and Rules for the Direct Brdcst. Satellite Serv., Report and Order, 17
F.C.C.R. 11331, paras. 33-34, 27 Comm. Reg (P & F) 1 (2002) [hereinafter DBS Report and
Order]. DBS licensees previously were required to obtain waivers. 47 C.F.R. § 100.11
(repealed 2002).
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1. Statutes
It is striking that there are so few content restrictions of any sort on
video services providers. To the extent they exist, however, content
restrictions (e.g., indecency restrictions) are greater on broadcasters than on
cable operators or DBS providers. The oft-stated justification is that these
differences reflect the differences in the levels of constitutional protection
for the various transmission platforms, particularly the Red Lion rationale
that spectrum scarcity permits greater regulation of broadcast content.
Thus, as a result of choices made by Congress and sanctioned by the
judicial branch, cable and DBS providers are free from content restrictions
that apply to broadcasters.' 70 These differences are likely to remain until the
Supreme Court decides to revisit Red Lion. 7 ' With respect to the other
content restrictions (e.g., political advertising, children's TV), similar rules
apply to all providers.
Another statutorily-imposed difference concerns access requirements,
which apply to cable and DBS providers (who control access to multiple
channels), but not to broadcasters (who control access to only one channel).
Cable companies challenged the statutes in court, arguing that "must-carry"
violates their First Amendment rights to choose their own programming but
the Supreme Court rejected those claims on the grounds that ensuring the
survival of broadcast TV was a valid statutory purpose.' 72
In several respects, Congress has sought to put cable and DBS
providers on an equal footing. For instance, as noted, both cable and DBS
providers are required to offer broadcast signal carriage. 73 Congress also
enacted SHVIA to give DBS providers the same rights as cable operators to
offer local programming to their customers.'74 In addition, Congress
170. See HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL, MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 153-159 (1999)
(describing and criticizing "variable First Amendment" protection for identical program
depending on the transmission source).
171. See, e.g., Charles W. Logan, Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for
Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1700
(1997); Monroe E. Price, Red Lion and the Constitutionality of Regulation: A Conversation
Among the Justices, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 89-117 (Charles
M. Firestone & Amy Korzick Garner eds., 1998) (depicting imaginary conversation using
Justices' actual statements in reported decisions).
172. Turner Brdcst. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 197 (1997) ("Congress [had] specific
support for its conclusion that cable operators had considerable and growing market power
over local video programming markets.").
173. The requirements are not exactly alike. Cable operators are required to carry a
specified number of local broadcast signals ("must-carry"). DBS providers, by contrast, are
not required to carry any broadcast signals, but if they carry one signal they must carry all
the signals ("carry one, carry all").
174. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY, supra note 91, at 544-557 (discussing
Congressional efforts to remove disparities between cable and DBS operators).
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imposed a public access requirement on DBS providers that is similar to
the PEG access requirement often imposed by LFAs on cable operators.
Statutory differences also exist with respect to the national ownership
rules that apply to broadcasters and cable operators. Congress set the
national TV audience limit at thirty-nine percent but did not specify the
limit for cable audience reach; instead, Congress directed the Commission
to set "reasonable limits." A significant development on the media
ownership front is the almost across-the-board elimination of prohibitions
on cross-ownership, as a result of actions taken by Congress, the courts,
and the Commission.
2. Jurisdictional Differences
Cable and DBS operators face different entry requirements. Cable
operators pay a franchise fee to local franchising authorities; DBS
operators do not pay a franchising fee to the FCC, although they may incur
substantial expenses in acquiring spectrum at auction.
IV. DATA SERVICES
A. Background
All the important legal issues in the new telecosm cut across
technology and traditional categories of service. The telecosm today
encompasses television, cable, and telephone. It spans wireline and
wireless. It is under ground, in the air, and in geosynchronous orbit. It
doesn't move voice, video, or data: it moves bits. 175
With the advent of digital data transmissions and the explosive
growth of the Internet, data networks are becoming the networks over
which all communications services can be offered. Particularly on
broadband digital channels, "data encompasses everything."' 176
Determining the appropriate regulatory framework for data networks is one
of the most significant challenges facing communications policymakers. 177
175. FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW, supra note 6, at xxv.
176. See FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 984 ("[D]ata inmates
are taking over the regulatory asylum.").
177. See e.g., Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11501, 11624 (1998) (concurring statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell) ("Sorting
hybrid services into their appropriate regulatory bin is difficult, yet something we will be
forced to do more and more as new and innovative services explode from the fuel of IP
networks. This reflects the growing challenge of adapting a balkanized regulatory structure
to a world of technological convergence.").
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"Data services" is not a statutorily-defined term. 7 8 Instead, the
Commission has developed various policies for different types of data
services. This Article first discusses the rules for "enhanced services,"
which the Commission determined should be applied to the statutory
category of "information services." '179  The rules for narrowband
information services offered by telecommunications carriers are discussed
in Part IV.B.1. Rules for regulating broadband services offered by
telecommunications carriers' 80 and cable operators'' are also discussed in
this Part. Next, the Article discusses rules for other types of data services
provided by broadcasters, DBS providers, and wireless telecommunications
carriers. The rules for these services are discussed in Part IV.B.2.
B. Regulatory Issues
1. Information Services
a. Narrowband Internet Access
Under the Computer II rules, all facilities-based carriers who offer
interstate information services are required to offer the transmission
component of their service as a separate tariffed service. 82 They are also
required to acquire transmission services for their own service at tariffed
rates. These requirements apply alike to dominant and nondominant
178. As used in this Article, "data services" refer to narrowband and broadband Internet
access, as well as the ancillary services provided by CMRS carriers, broadcasters, and DBS
providers.
179. See Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272, of
the Comm. Act of 1934 as amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905, para. 103, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 696 (1996)
("[A]ll enhanced services are information services, [but] not all information services are
enhanced services."). "Information service" is "the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications .. " 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000); see Fed.-State Joint
Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, paras. 39, 59, 11 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1312 (1998).
180. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facils.,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, paras. 32-37 (2002) [hereinafter
Wireline Broadband Notice].
181. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facils., Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002)
[hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling].
182. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (2002); see Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision, 77
F.C.C.2d 384, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 669 (1980) [hereinafter Computer Il]. See generally
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 1107-29.
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carriers.183 Facilities-based carriers were initially required, under the
Computer H rules, to offer information services through a separate
subsidiary, but are now permitted to offer services if they adopt
nonstructural safeguards.' 84
Under the nonstructural safeguards approach, a facilities-based carrier
is required to unbundle its local network ("open network architecture" or
"ONA") and interconnect with unaffiliated providers on the same terms as
it interconnects with its own information service affiliates ("comparably
efficient interconnection" or "CEI"). 185
b. Broadband Internet Access
There are several major ongoing proceedings to determine the
classification and appropriate regulatory treatment of broadband services
offered over DSL lines and cable modems. In December 2001, the FCC
initiated a proceeding to determine whether ILECs should be reclassified as
nondominant providers of broadband telecommunications services. 186 If
ILECs are reclassified as nondominant providers of broadband
telecommunications services, they may be exempt from tariff and other
requirements for these services. In December, 2002, the Commission
decided to forbear from requiring SBC Communications to file tariffs for
advanced services provided through its affiliate, but the Commission
deferred action on SBC's petition to be declared nondominant in the
provision of advanced services.'87
183. Wireline Broadband Notice, supra note 180, para. 42; see Policy and Rules
Concerning the Interstate, Interexch. Marketplace, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418,
paras. 39-46, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 641 (2001) [hereinafter Marketplace Policy and
Rules]; Independent Data Comm. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10
F.C.C.R. 13717, paras. 42-46, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 409 (1995).
184. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702. See generally FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note
11, at 1107-29.
185. Third Computer Inquiry, Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, para. 343, 60 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 603 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III]. This unbundling requirement formed
the genesis of the Section 251 unbundling requirement in the Telecommunications Act of
1996. See FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 1097-1100.
186. Review of Reg. Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecomm. Servs.,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22745 (2001).
187. Review of Reg. Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecomm. Servs.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 27000, para. 1 (2002). The Commission's
authority to forbear from enforcing certain laws is found in found in the Communications
Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2000). Under this provision, the Commission is required to
forbear from enforcing any telecommunications regulation if it finds that enforcement is
unnecessary to ensure that: (a) rates are reasonable, just and nondiscriminatory; (b)
consumers are protected; and (c) the public interest is served. Id. Furthermore, Congress
expressly excluded sections 251(c) (unbundling) and 271 (long-distance entry) from this
authority. Id. § 160(d).
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In February 2002, in the Wireline Broadband Notice, the Commission
tentatively concluded that an entity offering wireline broadband Internet
access over its own facilities is offering an "information service."' 88 The
Commission also tentatively concluded that "in the case where an entity
combines transmission over its own facilities with its offering of wireline
Internet access service, the classification of that input is
telecommunications, and not a telecommunications service."' 89 The
Commission also tentatively concluded that a carrier is providing a
telecommunications service to the extent it is providing only broadband
transmission on a stand-alone basis, without a broadband Internet access
service.' 90 The Commission also sought comment on whether the Computer
H tariffed access requirements should continue to apply to broadband
information services. 19 1 In particular, the Commission sought comment on
whether the Computer 1I tariffed access requirements should be imposed
only on carriers with market power.92
Select Broadband Issues
I)SI, nternt accss tele'omu nictnervi aces
Definitions NPRM tentatively classifies dinantd cable modem
and as an information service and service as "information service";
classifications transmission as 9th Cir. reversed, held that
"telecommunications" but not a transmission element of cable
"telecommunications service." broadband service is a
telecommunications service.
Regulatory ILECs now classified as dominant Cable modem services providers
status (under review); affiliates need not are not classified as common
file tariffs. carriers.
Unbundling/ Transmission must be unbundled NPRM on whether Title I
open access and offered at tariffed rates (policy requirements apply.
is under review). No need to
unbundle fiber loops. Line-sharing
not required. NPRM on whether
Title I requirements apply.
Universal Must include revenues from Not required to contribute at
service bundled telecom/information present but Commission has
services offerings, pending further sought comment on whether to
clarification, require contributions.
188. Wireline Broadband Notice, supra note 180, paras. 17-25.
189. Id. para. 25.
190. Id. para. 26. ILECs are required to offer any requesting carrier unbundled access to
network elements for providing a telecommunications service. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c)(3) (2000).
191. Wireline Broadband Notice, supra note 180, paras. 44-47.
192. Id. para. 46.
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In March, 2002, in the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, the
Commission classified cable modem Internet access as an "information
service. '  The Commission concluded that cable operators are not
required to unbundle the transmission component of cable modem Internet
access and offer it to consumers as a stand-alone service. 194 The
Commission sought comment on whether it should preempt state laws in
three areas that may be affected by the classification of cable modem
services as an information service: access requirements, franchise
requirements, and franchise fees.195 The Commission also sought comment
on whether any alternative access requirements should be imposed on cable
operators under the Commission's Title I authority. 96 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed with the Commission's classification of cable
modem services as an information service.'97 Citing its previous ruling in
AT&T v. City of Portland,'98 the court held that cable broadband service
consisted of two elements: a "pipeline" and the Internet service transmitted
through that pipeline.' Further, the court held that the transmission
element of cable broadband service (i.e., the "pipeline") was a
"telecommunications service."2°
In August 2003, in the Triennial Review Order, the Commission
issued a major ruling on unbundling requirements.20' First, the Commission
reaffirmed that copper loops must be provided on an unbundled basis to
any requesting carrier for the provision of narrowband and broadband
* 20services. 02 Second, the Commission held that ILECs were not required to
unbundle Hybrid Fiber Copper Loops ("HFCL") for providing broadband
services. 2°3 Third, the Commission held that ILECs were not required to
unbundle fiber-to-the-home ("FTI'H") loops. 2° Last, the Commission held
that LECs were not required to offer "line-sharing," i.e., access to the high
193. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 181, paras. 34-59. The Commission
also tentatively concluded that, to the extent cable modem service was classified as a
telecommunications service by a court, the Commission would forbear from common carrier
regulation of that service. Id. para. 95.
194. Id.
195. Id. para. 99.
196. Id. paras. 72-74.
197. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
198. 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
199. Brand X lnternet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1129.
200. Id.
201. Triennial Review Order, supra note 49.
202. Id. paras. 248-250.
203. Id. para. 288. ILECs, however, are required to unbundle HFCLs to the extent
necessary to provide voice services. Id. para. 296.
204. Id. paras. 273-280. ILECs, however, are required to unbundle FITH to the extent
necessary to provide narrowband services. Id. para. 277.
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frequency portion of copper loops that would be used to provide broadband
DSL access."0 5 On March 2, 2004, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld these portions of the order." 6
There are also several efforts underway to reform the universal
service contribution methodology to accommodate the growth of new
technologies and services. In 2002, the Commission determined that any
telecommunications carrier offering interstate telecommunications services,
including broadband transmission services on a stand-alone basis to
affiliated or unaffiliated end users, including Internet Service Providers
("ISPs"), must contribute for revenues from that service.2 °7 If interstate
telecommunications services, bundled with information services, are
offered to consumers, the carrier may elect to contribute on the basis of
only the revenue from the telecommunications services or, if it cannot
separate such revenue, all revenues from the bundled offering. The
Commission recently sought comment on whether these requirements are
consistent with its tentative conclusion that wireline broadband Internet
access is an "information service. 2 °8 At present, Commission rules do not
require providers of cable modem services to contribute to the universal
service fund.2' The Commission has sought comment on whether cable
modem providers and other facilities-based providers of broadband
services should be required to contribute.210 In addition, on March 12, 2004,
the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which seeks
comment on how the classification of IP-enabled services, including Voice
over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") services, would affect the Commission's
ability to fund universal service. 1
205. Id. paras. 255-263. However, the Commission adopted a three-year transition period
for phasing out the line sharing rules and grandfathered existing line sharing arrangements.
Id. paras. 264-269.
206. See USTA v. FCC, No. 00-10 12, 2004 WL 374262, slip op. at 34-46 (D.C.
Cir. 2004). The court of appeals, however, reversed other portions of the order on the issue
of unbundling switches. See supra note 49.
207. Wireline Broadband Notice, supra note 180; see also Marketplace Policy and
Rules, supra note 183, paras. 47-54, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 641 (2001).
208. Wireline Broadband Notice, supra note 180, at paras. 72-74.
209. See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 181, paras. 41, 110.
210. Id. para 110; see also Wireline Broadband Notice, supra note 180, paras. 79-80.
211. VOIPNPRM, supra note 89, para. 63.
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2. Ancillary Data Services
a. Wireless Data
CMRS providers offer a wide range of mobile data services, including
short messaging services, circuit-switched and packet-switched data
transmissions, and dedicated data networks. 212 These data services are
generally regulated to the same extent that CMRS telecommunications
services are regulated, except that CMRS data services are exempt from
certain regulations (e.g., local number portability, e-9 11) that apply only to
providers of voice telecommunications services.1 3 Cellular and PCS
licensees are also permitted to offer their own audio or video programming
(e.g., sports, weather, or other information and entertainment) and CMRS
data services.214 CMRS licensees, however, are prohibited from offering
broadcast services. This prohibition does not apply, however, to offering
video services on a nonbroadcast basis. 21
b. Broadcast Data
Broadcasters are permitted to offer data services within the main
video signals, as well as portions of the spectrum such as the subcarrier
bands 216 and the vertical blanking interval217 that are not used for broadcast
purposes, provided they do not interfere with the video transmission.218
Nonbroadcast data services are also permitted as ancillary or
supplementary services on digital TV channels. 219 The Commission
exempted these activities from traditional broadcast regulations, such as the
requirement to offer airtime to political candidates at low rates, 220 but it
212. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Sixth Report, 16 F.C.C.R. 13350, 13395-96, 24 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 170 (2001).
213. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 52.21(c) (2002); Id. § 52.31; Id. § 20.18(a) (2003).
214. See FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 883.
215. Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Permit Flexible Serv. Offerings in the
Commercial Mobile Radio Serv., First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 8965, para. 25, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1190 (1996).
216. 47 C.F.R. § 73.667 (2002).
217. Id. § 73.646. Such services may include the "transmission of data, processed
information, or any other communication in either a digital or analog mode." See
Amendment of Parts 2, 73, and 76, Report and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 973, para. 3, 57 Rad.
Reg.2d 832 (1985) [hereinafter Vertical Blanking Interval Order].
218. Digital Data Transmission Within the Video Portion of Brdcst. Station
Transmission, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C. R. 7799, 3 Comm. Reg. 519 (1996) [hereinafter
Digital Data Transmission].
219. Advanced TV Sys. and Their Impact upon the Existing TV Brdcst. Serv., Fifth
Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, paras. 34-36, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 863 (1997)
[hereinafter Advanced Television Systems].
220. Digital Data Transmission, supra note 218, para 18.
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reserved the right to impose "public interest" requirements "if significant
public interest uses of this ancillary transmission technology suggest
themselves. '2 1 To the extent that these nonbroadcast services offer
common carrier services, Title II rules may apply, although commentators
note that the Commission has rarely, enforced these rules.222 To the extent
that ancillary transmissions are a common carrier service, broadcasters are
prohibited from exercising control over the content of these services. 23
However, FCC rules require licensees to maintain records of "material
transmitted in a broadcast mode," and authorize rejecting any material that
is "inappropriate or undesirable. 224
c. DBS Data
In 1995, the Commission permitted DBS licensees to use the
spectrum for ancillary or non-DBS uses provided that at least half of total
capacity at a given orbital location was used for DBS service.225 In June
2002, the Commission removed any restriction on spectrum use for non-
DBS services.226 Such services may utilize the DBS downlink bands in
combination with uplink from another service (e.g., fixed satellite services)
to offer two-way broadband Internet access.
C. Summary and Analysis
As noted above, in several related major proceedings pending at
present, the Commission is reviewing its policies on broadband Internet
access. One issue among the many in these proceedings is whether the
Commission should seek to achieve "regulatory parity. '227 There is sharp
disagreement on this question. ILECs take the position that, "[t]he
221. Id; see Advanced Television Systems, supra note 219, para. 34.
222. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.667(b) ("TV subsidiary communications services that are
common carrier... in nature are subject to common carrier... regulation."). But see
Vertical Blanking Interval Order, supra note 217, para. 15 (requiring that VBI services be
regulated in same manner as teletext, FM subcarriers, and TV aural subcarriers); FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 11, at 1058-59 ("Although services delivered over
the VBI ... have been deemed common carrier, the Commission has chosen to forbear from
imposing traditional Title II requirements.").
223. Digital Data Transmission, supra note 218, para. 16.
224. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.646(d), 73.667(e).
225. DBS Auction Order, supra note 168, para. 17.
226. DBS Report and Order, supra note 169, paras. 145-48.
227. See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 181, para. 85; Wireline
Broadband Notice, supra note 180, para. 6. In addition, legislation was introduced in
Congress to require the Commission to develop rules to provide for parity in regulatory
treatment of broadband service providers and broadband access services providers. See
Broadband Regulatory Parity Act of 2002, S. 2430, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (2002).
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continued imposition by the FCC of disparate regulatory burdens that
disadvantage ILECs in the competitive broadband marketplace is punitive
and unjustified."2 ' Not surprisingly, the cable industry takes a different
view: "notions of regulatory parity ignore fundamental differences among
participants in the broadband marketplace, and take no account of the
legacy regulations that have developed over the last half century to deal
with the specific marketplace characteristics of such participants." '229 It
would be foolhardy to speculate here about how the Commission or the
courts will resolve these issues.23°
Ancillary data services are generally fully deregulated so that there
are very few, if any, differences in regulatory treatment.
V. CONCLUSION
The lesson from this survey is that the constraints on the
Commission's ability to achieve regulatory parity in communications
policy may be underappreciated. In many cases, differential treatment is
required by statute, such as with respect to the content restrictions that
apply to broadcasters but not to cable or DBS operators,' the
interconnection and unbundling rules that apply to ILECs but not to
CLECs,23 2 and the exemption from equal access for CMRS carriers. 233 In
these circumstances, the Commission has no authority to require parity. In
still other cases, Congress has legislated equal or comparable treatment and
the Commission has sought to fulfill this mandate. For example, in Section
332 of the 1996 Act, which requires similar regulatory treatment for all
228. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facils., Comments of United States Telecom Association, CS Docket No. 02-52, at 7,
available at http://www.usta.org/filings/2002/dock02-52CablecoverTable.pdf (last visited
Apr. 19, 2004); see also J. Gregory Sidak et al., The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric
Regulation of Broadband Internet Access, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 953 (2002).
229. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facils., Comments of National Cable Telecommunications Association, CS Docket 02-52, at
41, available at http://www.ncta.com/pdf files/CSDock02-52Comm.pdf (last visited Apr.
18, 2004); see also Howard J. Symons et al, Regulatory Parity Will Always Be Around the
Corner, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TELECOM DEALS: M&A, REGULATORY AND
FINANCING ISSUES 2000, 1192 PLI/CORP 1025, 1038 (2000) ("Adopting a uniform regulatory
scheme for all services would prevent policy makers from considering the nuances of
individual services and the specific needs of consumers and businesses, and risks
misapplying old paradigms to new technologies and services.").
230. For a critical analysis of the major issues, see Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal
and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a
New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L. J. 207, 224-241 (2003) [hereinafter Frieden,
Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation].
231. See text accompanying note 170.
232. See text accompanying note 51.
233. See text accompanying note 63.
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providers of "mobile services; '' 234 and SHVIA, which aimed to put cable
and DBS operators on an equal footing concerning the availability of local
broadcast programming, the Commission has sought to achieve regulatory
parity.235
Another obstacle to achieving regulatory parity is that the
Commission may lack jurisdiction over particular services and providers.236
For instance, there may be disparities in the licensing fees and entry
conditions applicable to DBS operators, who are licensed by the
Commission, and cable operators, who are licensed by local franchising
authorities. This issue may also arise in the context of broadband Internet
access to the extent that ILECs (who are DSL providers) must comply with
regulatory requirements like tariffing and reporting rules imposed by the
FCC and state commissions, while cable companies (who are cable modem
service providers) must comply with an entirely different set of
requirements (e.g., franchising fees, public access channels) imposed by
LFAs.
Perhaps the most significant barrier to achieving regulatory parity is
that it is rarely the case that two types of providers are so alike that they
must be treated in exactly the same manner. "Parity" is raised as an issue
when one party falls squarely within the terms of a rule and the other party
does not, but the argument is made that "fairness" or "a level playing field"
or some similar value demands that the two parties should be treated
equally.237 In these cases, there is often a stalemate when one side argues
that regulatory parity should apply and the other side responds that it
should not apply because the services are not similar. Trying to achieve
parity in these circumstances may induce paralysis in policymaking. A
better approach would be to resolve the issues on the basis of specific rules
234. See text accompanying note 19.
235. See text accompanying note 113. Congress, similarly, may have sought to achieve
parity when it required DBS operators to make channel capacity available for "non-
commercial programming of an educational or informational nature," in much the same
manner that LFAs require cable operators to make capacity available for public, educational,
and governmental access. 47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (2000). See text accompanying notes 110 and
131.
236. By contrast, the Commission may be able to achieve uniformity by exercising
federal preemption authority in cases where a particular service falls within the
Commission's jurisdiction. See generally FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note
11, at 240-256; ZUCKMAN ET AL, supra note 170, at 761-768 (1999).
237. See, e.g., Antonia M. Apps & Thomas M. Dailey, Non-Regulation of Advanced
internet Services, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 681, 682-683 (2000) ("[I]t is difficult to
understand why different technologies should trigger different regulatory requirement for
the same service.").
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or policies, rather than to seek to eliminate alleged disparities.238 In legal
terms, this suggests a focus on "rights" rather than "equality." 239 It is
unlikely, however, that policy advocates will banish the term "regulatory
parity" from their working repertoire. Like the term "equality," 240 the term
238. An alternative to the options discussed in the text is to engage in a wholesale
revision of communications laws to accommodate network convergence. See Benjamin
Lipschitz, Regulatory Treatment of Network Convergence: Opportunities and Challenges in
the Digital Era, 7 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 14, 19 (1998) ("Underlying the network convergence
environment is the pending demise of the massive governmental regime-a legacy of
redundant and sometimes inconsistent schema, that has spawned and nurtured the disparate
network industries.); M. Anne Swanson & J. G. Harrington, The Future of
Telecommunications (As We Know It)-Blurred Boundaries and Jurisdictional Conflicts, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY &
REGULATION, 584 PLU/Pat 139, 145 (1999) (regulators "will be forced to determine not only
what is subject to traditional telecommunications regulation and what is not, but also to
determine whether other obligations must be applied to new hybrid services"); Lisa
Blumensaadt, Horizontal and Conglomerate Merger Conditions: An Interim Regulatory
Approach for a Converged Environment, 8 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 291, 292 (2000) ("As
delivery of services converges over an increasing number of transmission media, it becomes
increasingly arbitrary to regulate according to the underlying transmission medium over
which the service happens to be delivered."); Rob Frieden, Regulatory Opportunism in
Telecommunications: The Unlevel Playing Field, 10 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 81, 99 (2001)
("Governments should not automatically extend the application of legacy regulatory regimes
to Internet-mediated equivalent services."); Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical
in Telecommunications Regulation, supra note 230, at 245 ("A better way to consider the
appropriate regulatory regime lies in the distillation of convergent services along a
horizontal plane .. "); Philip J. Weiser, Toward A Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35
Loy. U. CHI. L. REv. 41, 41 (2003) ("Over time, the FCC will thus need to shift its focus
from specific regulatory approaches based on the particular technology platform... to a
"layered" model" of telecommunications regulation that regulates functionally similar
services in the same way regardless of the underlying technology platform."); James B.
Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 15 (2004) (discussing
limits of FCC's Title I authority).
239. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 593
(1982) (distinguishing between "rights" and "equality"). Professor Westen's response to
critics who argue that "equality" is needed to ensure fairness in the administration of rules is
worth noting:
It is true that rules should be applied equally, consistently, and impartially, if
by "equally," "consistently," and "impartially" one means the tautological
proposition that the rule should be applied in all cases to which the terms of
the rule dictate that it be applied. But it is wrong to think that, once a rule is
applied in accord with its own terms, equality has something additional to
say about the scope of the rule-something that is not already inherent in the
substantive terms of the rule itself. To say that a rule should be applied
"equally," "consistently," or "uniformly" means simply that the rule should
be applied to the cases to which it applies.
Id. at 551 (footnotes omitted). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply
to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983) (noting that although Professor Westen
establishes that equality is insufficient to resolve moral and legal controversies, equality is a
morally valuable concept for other reasons).
240. Westen, supra note 239 at 593 ("[V]alues asserted in the form of equality tend to
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"regulatory parity" has a powerful effect on listeners. In addition, this is a
favorite among economists.24' Thus, regulatory parity arguments will
continue to be made. These arguments would be more effective, however,
if they specify the source of the alleged disparity. If the disparity results
from action taken by Congress, the Commission has no discretion to
change the law. If the disparity stems from the actions taken by states or
localities, the Commission's ability may be similarly circumscribed. The
strongest arguments are likely to be those that seek to apply a rule to two
closely situated parties, in areas where a policymaker has the discretion to
act. If the comparison is made between two services that are not closely
similar, are regulated by different jurisdictions, or are subject to different
laws enacted by Congress, disparities are sure to exist, and policymakers
will likely be unable to eliminate them. Indeed, in these conditions, the
values of equal treatment and fairness may dictate that just as like cases
should be treated alike, unlike cases should be treated differently. Simple
rules are not sufficient to solve these complex disputes; there is no
substitute for common sense and a case-by-case analysis.
carry greater moral and legal weight than they deserve on the merits. That is why arguments
in the form of equality invariably place all opposing arguments on the 'defensive."').
241. See e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett et al, The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An
Economic Analysis of the "Level Playing Field' in Cable TV Franchising Statutes,
BUSINESS & POLITICS, Aug. 2001, at 21, 22 ("Economists, as a rule, like symmetric
regulation."). The authors (one of whom is a former FCC Chief Economist) also note,
however, that "the pursuit of a level playing field can yield surprisingly asymmetric
consequences." Id. at 43.
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